Although it is widely held that sellers prefer to appear early in a consumer's search, some evidence from online markets suggests this need not be the case. We develop a model which incorporates costly search and costly recall and demonstrate that when both frictions are small, appearing later may be better. When recall is free, prominence is desirable by standard logic, however costly recall induces a tradeoff -it benefits the prominent seller by reducing the initial search but also benefits the later seller by preventing return conditional on search. We show that later can be better whenever values are sufficiently correlated, or whenever values are drawn independently from a distribution in which two draws are likely to be near one another.
Introduction
In the consumer search literature, it is often assumed that the order in which consumers search is random. However, there are many situations in which the order of search is not random (Armstrong (2016) ). For example, online search results are arranged by relevance and consumers typically begin at the top of the page and work their way down (Ursu (2016) ). Casual intuition suggests that when consumer search is ordered in this way, sellers that are higher up on the list have an advantage over those which are lower on the list, and recent theoretical work has confirmed this. Whether products are homogeneous (Arbatskaya (2007) ) or differentiated (Armstrong et al. (2009) , Armstrong and Zhou (2011a) , Zhou (2011) ), the search cost allows a prominent seller to win consumers even in situations in which he offers a worse utility than competitors.
However, the data presented in Figure 1 (from De los Santos and Koulayev (2012) , p. 31) seem to tell a different story. Depicted are the number of clicks for search results on Kayak.com for hotel stays in the city of Chicago during May 2007. For each search there were 15 results shown per page, with multiple pages available to the consumer by clicking "Next", and the figure shows the total number of clicks at each position. Results were returned in decreasing order of popularity as is evidenced by the decreasing click rate within each page. However the monotonicity is broken across pages. For instance, the 16th result which appears at the top of page two received more clicks than any of the results 4-15 on the first page, and similarly the 31st result which appears at the top of page three received more clicks than any of the results 20-30 on the second page. In other words, the data suggests that often "later is better".
Motivated by this example, we develop a more comprehensive model of search prominence which can accommodate both settings in which prominence confers a competitive advantage, as in the aforementioned literature, as well as settings in which"later is better". Specifically, it is typically assumed that searching for a new option is costly but that it is costless to return to options previously observed if further search proves disappointing. While this assumption is made for convenience and is innocuous when the number of sellers is infinite, Janssen and Parakhonyak (2014) shows it can be consequential when the number of seller is finite, which is precisely when search prominence has bite (Armstrong et al. (2009) ).
In reality recall is rarely costless, since often the very costs associated with the travel and time necessary to obtain a new offer also apply to returning and accepting an offer from a previous seller. Furthermore, even when the recall cost is minimal as with many online markets, it may still play an important role in the same sense that a minimal search costs plays a role in Diamond (1971) . We thus introduce a cost of recall into a setting of search with prominence and investigate how this cost affects the advantage of prominence. Specifically, we consider a differentiated product duopoly in the style of Wolinsky (1986) 
/01-.6789-:.;,-:-.<=4>?.@>>7::-A Figure 1 : Clicks for hotel searches a consumer pays a search cost to visit each firm to learn the match value, and must visit the prominent firm first and the follower firm second. In addition, a consumer that visits both firms and then wishes to buy from the initial prominent firm must pay a return cost to do so.
In this setting a cost of recall has two opposing effects. On the one hand, conditional on the consumer searching past the prominent seller, costly recall makes returning to that seller less attractive which reduces the profitability of prominence. On the other hand, anticipating that return will be costly, a consumer is less inclined to search, which works to the advantage of prominence. We show that when the return cost is small the first effect may dominate and later may be better. More precisely, we identify two characterizations of match distributions under which the prominent firm may be less profitable when the search cost and the return cost are small. The first, called chunkiness, measures the likelihood that two independent draws from the same distribution are near one another. We show that when the match distribution is sufficiently chunky then for small search and return costs later is better. Similarly, when the distribution is not chunky but the two draws are sufficiently correlated, then again later is better for small search and return costs. The intuition is as follows. Small search and return costs encourage consumers to search a second time in the hope of getting a better match, thus reducing the benefit of prominence. Furthermore, if the distribution is sufficiently chunky or the utilities are correlated, then there is a high probability that the two sellers' offers are tied, or nearly tied, in which case the return cost breaks the tie in favor of the second seller. In these cases, prominence is a competitive disadvantage and later is better.
Our analysis takes the search order as given, however the model we solve may also be thought of as the second stage of a game in markets in which firms compete in the first stage. Sellers may compete for prominence through advertising (Haan and Moraga-González (2011) ), price setting (Haan et al. (2015) , Armstrong and Zhou (2011b) ), obfuscation or disclosure (Wilson (2010) ), or other methods. Our results suggest that the intensity of the first stage competition strongly depends on the magnitudes of the search and return costs and the distributional properties of match values, and that in fact sometimes no competition should occur. We take as given the distributions of match qualities, which too could be influenced by sellers in the first stage through price setting, investments in quality, or other means. Because we wish to characterize the effects of prominence regardless of the process through which it emerges, we remain agnostic about these particulars of the first stage.
We begin with a simple example in Section 2 and demonstrate that for all symmetric threepoint distributions later is better when search and recall costs are small. In Section 3 we introduce the general setting and describe the optimal search strategy and ensuing seller payoffs when recall costs are positive. In Section 4 we restrict attention to cases in which match values are drawn independently, as is typically assumed in search models, and in Section 5 we instead allow for draws to be correlated. Section 6 then includes a discussion of the application of our results to several topics of interest.
An Example
A consumer with unit demand may buy from either seller A or seller B. The consumer's utility for either seller i's product is uncertain and is given by
L with probability x M with probability 1 − 2x H with probability x , with u A and u B drawn independently,
. The consumer does not initially know her utilities but may learn them by searching sequentially. The order of search is exogenously determined, such that she first searches at the prominent seller A and then at the other seller B, with search cost s ≥ 0 for each visit. In addition there is a recall cost r > 0 if the consumer wishes to return and accept at A after having visited B. The consumer has no outside option and must buy either from A or from B.
Utilities are thus distributed symmetrically around M, with x = 1 3 corresponding to even weights on all three outcomes, x < 1 3 corresponding to distributions with a single peak, and x > 1 3 corresponding to distributions with a single trough. We now show that regardless of the shape of the distribution, when search and recall costs are low the consumer is more likely to buy from B than from A.
Proposition 1 For any x and δ, if s and r > 0 are sufficiently small so that s x + r < δ then the consumer is more likely to buy from B then from A.
Proof Consider the consumer's search strategy. Since r < δ by assumption, it is optimal to return to A at the end of search whenever A's offer is strictly better than B's. Having observed u A = L, the consumer searches since her payoff from this is xL
with the inequality following from the assumption. Having observed u A = M, the consumer also searches since her expected payoff from this is
with the inequality again following from the assumption. Finally having observed u A = H it is optimal for the consumer not to search, since the payoff to doing so is (x)(H −r)
With this search strategy, the probability that A makes the sale is
. Then, since Q B = 1 − Q A it is more likely that B makes the sale.
The intuition for the result is illustrated in Figure 2 . Both the leader A and the follower B make the sale whenever their utility is highest, and sales differ only in the cases of ties. In the northeast HH region the search friction breaks the tie in favor of A, and indeed this is the effect captured by Armstrong et al. (2009) . For the center MM and southwest LL regions the tie is broken by the return friction in favor of seller B. Since for the given family of symmetric distributions the LL and HH regions are equally likely, B sells more often than A.
The return cost induces a tradeoff for search prominence, helping the leader by decreasing the benefit of searching and helping the follower by decreasing the benefit of returning conditional on searching. To see this consider a situation with s = 0 and initially also r = 0, in which ties are broken evenly. The consumer always observes both offers and the sellers are on equal footing regardless of the order of search; they make the sale whenever their utility is higher and they evenly split sales in case of ties. Now, when the return cost increases to
Figure 2: Sales by A and B for the discrete distribution 0 < r < δ the consumer's search strategy changes so that she immediately accepts Figure 2 . Thus, even in the absence of a search cost the return cost benefits A by breaking HH ties in its favor, and benefits B by breaking MM and LL ties in its favor. By contrast, if r > δ then it becomes optimal for the consumer not to continue searching both when u A = H and u A = M. Now the prominent seller A both captures MM ties and also wins when (u A , u B ) = (M, H), and sells with a higher likelihood than B. Thus, in this example return costs introduce a tradeoff for whether it pays to be prominent, with the net effect positive for small r and negative for large r. We now consider a more general setting and derive the conditions under which prominence is not desirable.
General Model
As in the preceding example there is a prominent seller A and a follower seller B. A consumer with search cost s ≥ 0 and return cost r > 0 has unit demand and her values for the products of the two sellers are uncertain and drawn from a joint distribution
, and and well-defined densities for each. To simplify the analysis we assume as in Anderson and Renault (1999) that the consumer has no outside option and must choose from among A and B.
Search Strategy
Having observed both u A and u B the consumer optimally chooses max(u A − r, u B ). Having observed only u A ≥ r, the consumer's continuation value is
That is, if the consumer searches she pays search cost s, accepts all offers u B ≥ u A − r, and returns to A whenever u B < u A − r. The second line then follows from rearranging terms and applying integration by parts.
As in Rothschild (1974) , this assumption is needed to ensure that a threshold strategy is optimal. Specifically, the term w(u A , r) captures the expected benefit from searching and is affected by u A in two ways. First, when the consumer observes a higher u A there are fewer observations of u B that make searching worthwhile. Second, when observing a higher u A the consumer may update her beliefs about the distribution of u B . If the two utilities are independent or negatively correlated then w is guaranteed to decrease in u A . However, if the utilities are positively correlated then for w to decrease it must be that first effect dominates the second, or more precisely that −
Given Assumption 1 the consumer uses a thresholdû for search, which at interior solutions (i.e.û ≥ u + r) satisfies 0 = −(s + r) + w(û, r).
To guarantee that an interior solution exists we assume that search frictions are sufficiently small as follows.
If this assumption holds with a strict inequality then at u A = r the benefit of searching w(u A , u A ) outweighs the cost s + r and thus the thresholdû > u + r. Observe that the The probability that the consumer buys from A is thus
where in the first term the consumer searches at B and returns only if u B ≤ u A − r, and in the second term the consumer accepts immediately at A. Similarly, the probability the consumer buys from B is
where B makes the sale only if A's offer is not better by more than r and is not higher than the thresholdû. Figure 3 illustrates the tradeoff associated with prominence. The blue area depicts the set of outcomes in which u A < u B but A still makes the sale since u A >û, while the red area depicts outcomes in which u B < u A but B makes the sales due to the return cost. The net effect in general depends on the probability mass in each of these areas, witĥ u also changing as the masses change. We now derive conditions under which the red area dominates and thus that later is better.
Independent Utilities
Here we consider a setting in which utilities are independently drawn from the same distribution F A (u) = F B (u) = F (u), as is common in the consumer search literature. Assumption 1 is satisfied automatically for any F , and thus the search threshold in (1) is well-defined. Because the distributions are identical, the comparison between being visited first and second simplifies to
As depicted Figure 3 , A benefits from being first when search is pre-empted and consumers do not discover B's higher offer, as captured by the third term, while B benefits from being last when return to A is preempted, as captured by the two terms in brackets. The comparison of the two effects is not immediate sinceû is endogenously determined by the distribution F and the search and return costs. A decrease in return cost r has countervailing effects -it increases the search thresholdû (increasing the second term and reducing the third term) thereby making later better, but also decreases the likelihood of return conditional on search (reducing the integrand of the second term). While in our leading example we could ensure that later is better when s and r are small, as we now demonstrate there are some distributions for which it is always better to be first for any values of the search frictions.
Proposition 2 If F is uniform on [0, 1] then ∆Q ≤ 0 for all s and r.
Proof To obtain result, observe that the search threshold in (1) (1 − u) du ⇔û = 1 − √ 2s + 2r + r, and that plugging into (4) obtains
Thus the value of prominence is fixed at s.
This result may seem surprising in light of the opening example, in which for every symmetric three-point distribution, including the uniform analog with x = 1 3
, later is better for small search and recall costs. However, the key difference across the two settings is the probability mass on realizations (u A , u B ) in which the recall cost is pivotal in directing the consumer to buy from B rather than returning to A. In the discrete example these outcomes are the exact ties LL and MM, and the mass on these outcomes is fixed for any r > 0 no matter how small. By contrast, in the continuous uniform example the set of these outcomes is depicted in Figure 3 by the red band of height r around the diagonal, and as r decreases so too does the probability mass associated with this band. To ensure that for small enough r later is better, there must be sufficient likelihood that outcomes u A and u B are close.
Given that utilities are drawn independently, one way to induce close outcomes is to reduce the number of likely outcomes. For instance, in a steep unimodal distribution it is likely that u A and u B are both in the neighborhood of the peak, and if the peak is narrow they are close to one another. This might suggest that the benefit of being last is captured by a standard measure of dispersion such as variance, but this is not quite so. In particular, a bimodal distribution with the two peaks separated by a large distance has a high variance but also a high probability of close outcomes. That is, the fact that the two peaks are far apart is not relevant for the probability of close outcomes. With this in mind we propose the following measure.
Definition 1 Distribution G is chunkier than distribution F if it has the same (possibly infinite) support [u,ū] and
Chunkiness measures the average height of the density function and in this sense the continuous uniform distribution is extreme -for a fixed support it has the minimal chunkiness of all distributions, and thus it is always better to be first. However, as we now show if the distribution is sufficiently chunky then for small enough search and recall costs later is better.
then for small enough r and s later is better.
The proof uses the fact that ∆Q = 0 at s = r = 0, and demonstrates that at this point ∆Q increases in r whenever the condition of the proposition is satisfied. Observe that in the preceding uniform example ū u f 2 (u)du = f (ū) = 1 and thus ∆Q remains fixed in r.
It also follows that later is better for any distribution with f (ū) = 0, such as the normal distribution or in fact any distribution with an unbounded right tail. Furthermore, applying integration by parts to the above condition yields − ū u f ′ (u)F (u)du > 0, which implies that the proposition holds for any distribution with a downward sloping density or a symmetric single-peaked density. Finally, for two distributions F and G with f (ū) = g(ū), if G is chunkier than F then if later is better for F when r and s are small enough, then later is also better for G when r and s are small enough.
To get a clearer sense of when later is better and to verify that this is not a knife-edge case holding only in the limit, we numerically compute the following example. Suppose the density is
, 1 , which satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition 3 since f (ū) = f (1) = 0. Figure 4 demonstrates the set of combinations of (r, s) for which ∆Q > 0. Observe that when s is sufficiently small then for small values of r later is better, but, once r rises further it becomes better to be prominent. This in fact is analogous to the leading discrete example, where for small r the search threshold is u A = H and later is better, while for larger r the threshold drops to u A = M and then early is better. Chunkiness thus improves the payoff to the second seller by making close outcomes of u A and u B more likely when utilities are drawn independently. Alternatively this may be achieved if draws are correlated, which we explore next.
Correlated Utilities
Suppose there are two independent variables ε 1 and ε 2 , both drawn from distribution F with support [u,ū] . Utilities are u A = ε 1 and u B = ε 1 with probability ρ ε 2 with probability 1 − ρ , with ρ ∈ [0, 1) measuring the correlation of the two payoffs. The consumer's search threshold is described bŷ
which incorporates into (1) the fact that the conditional distribution F (u B |u A ) now has an atom of size ρ at u A . Simplifying this condition then yields
reflecting the fact that when the consumer pays search cost s she only receives a new draw with probability 1 − ρ. The difference between second and first is now
where in the first line with probability ρ utilities are identical and A wins the tie abovê u while B wins the tie belowû, and in the second line utilities are independent and the expression is identical to that in (4). If
, then the first term is increasing in ρ, and thus in these cases more correlation benefits seller B. An increase in ρ also reducesû by (5), and the net effect is ambiguous. However, if the search cost s falls sufficiently as ρ is increased then B improves, as demonstrated in the following. Proposition 4 If s and r are sufficiently small then there exists ρ(s, r) ∈ [0, 1) so that later is better whenever ρ ∈ [ρ(s, r), 1).
In the proof, as ρ is increased the search cost s is decreased so that s 1−ρ remains fixed, and thus so too doesû from (5). As ρ approaches one, only outcomes along the u A = u B diagonal become relevant, and thus later is better as long as the diagonal is longer belowû than above.
Discussion
While it is commonly held that appearing earlier in a consumer's search is desirable for a seller, we demonstrate here that this need not be the case. By allowing for a more realistic environment in which it is both costly to obtain new offers and to recall previous offers, we show that it is sometimes better to be later in the search order. Although it is well known that the search cost reduces the buyer's threshold and thus benefits the prominent seller, the return costs has countervailing effects. A consumer anticipating costly return is less likely to search, but also less likely to return conditional on search. We show that the latter effect can dominate whenever search and return costs are small and match values at both sellers are likely to be similar, and thus in these cases later is better.
Our analysis applies to several settings in which search order plays an important role. For example consider search for online content. Users enter a topic into a search engine and results are displayed in an order determined by an algorithm. The link to each article is accompanied by a short descriptive blurb, a signal of the quality of the match of the article with the user's interests, and users sequentially read the blurbs from the top down, eventually clicking on the desired article. How valuable is it for the content providers to appear higher in the list of results? Our analysis suggests that the answer largely depends on the type of content being provided. For instance, if the search is for a movie review then articles may be highly correlated, and if the user is patient and expects a possibility of a particularly insightful review, later may be better. On the other hand, if the user searches for funny cat videos, the humor of one result is likely uncorrelated with the other results, and cat videos that appear earlier likely receive more clicks.
Relatedly, if the platform sells top search positions then understanding the characteristics of the match value distribution for different types of content helps determine the demand for top spots. Pricing for prominence in search results should depend not only on the volume of traffic for the content, but also on the properties of the match value distributions that we describe. These considerations can guide the platform not only in the sale of prominent spots but also in the platform's design and organization. For instance, allowing for longer, more detailed blurbs provides a more informative signal for users, thereby leading to a less chunky distribution of match values and a higher return to prominence, while shortening or eliminating blurbs all together has the opposite effect.
The job market is another application. An employer searching for a suitable employee interviews job candidates successively. Other things being equal, how much more likely is a candidate to be hired if she is interviewed first and thus how much effort should she expend to be among the first interviewees? Or should she, to the contrary, strive to be interviewed last? If the distribution of candidates in the pool is chunky, for instance if most candidates fit the position similarly but with a small chance the match is outstanding, an employee is more likely to be hired if she is interviewed late rather than early. Here too the employer's design of the interview process affects the probability that earlier interviewees are hired. For example, requiring more or less detailed pre-interview information and documentation from applicants affects the distribution of match values between the employer and job applicants, which in turn determines the extent to which earlier applicants are more likely to be hired.
